The emergence of Russian multinational companies
With the transformation of the former Soviet system into a market economy the so-called "red multinationals" (Gutman, 1990; Hamilton, 1986; McMillan 1987; Sokolov, 1991) based in centrally planned economies vanished nearly overnight; altogether they were disposing of 175 subsidiaries abroad in 1990. The economic crisis that went alongside with transformational recession (Kornaï, 1994) had spread over the first years of transition and entailed the decline of former red MNCs, including those with headquarters in Russia. After 1991, these firms were confronted with new economic and financial constraints. Their liquidities dried out overnight and they were no longer able to fund their foreign subsidiaries. Many of them closed down due to under-capitalisation. Others went bankrupt or were taken over by foreign investors or new domestic oligarchs. All reduced their investment abroad and in some transition countries FDI outflows were practically phased out for some years (Svetlicic, 1997) . Transformational recession did affect Russian MNCs just like it happened to hit many companies inside Russia: they lost domestic outlets and a significant part of their traditional trade with former Comecon countries; they suffered from dramatic credit crunch and hard currency shortage; their entire production and distribution networks were disorganised by the collapse of central planning. The OFDI stock from the USSR fell from $ 699 million in 1990 down to a negligible value, close to nil in 1992 and 1993. For a while the pecking order in most Russian companies was topped by privatisation and restructuring, not investing abroad.
Paradoxically enough, a number of Russian firms spontaneously transformed into MNCs overnight simply because they were located in more than one former Soviet republic. Since these republics obtained the status of new independent states by end of 1991 or in 1992, a same company located in two or more former Soviet republics -it was often so under central planning -became all at once a multinational company. The break-up of the Soviet Union into 15 new nation states came out with an institutional creation of Russian MNCs, the so-called "born multinational" companies (Liuhto, 2001) . Besides, many Russian firms were turned into monopolistic or oligopolistic MNCs through a rushed privatisation from which foreign investors were almost entirely excluded such as mass privatisation in 1992 and the loans for shares scheme in 1995. From the mid-nineties on, the number of subsidiaries settled abroad by Russian firms started growing again and was already counted in the thousand in 2000 (Liuhto and Jumpponen, 2001 ) because the aforementioned institutional multinationalisation through splitting the former USSR was relayed since 1994 by a recovery in new FDI outflows from Russia (Andreff, 2002) . However, if 1994 is the milestone for a new emergence of Russian MNCs, one has to wait until 2000 and the end of the 1998 Russian financial crash economic consequences to witness a steady growth at swift pace of Russian FDI outflows and OFDI stocks (Table 1 ). Most of the biggest 100 Russian firms have gone multinational since 1999 or so (Andreff, 2003b) . step (Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Uzbekistan) and a few were close to the third step. The latter already exhibited important OFDI compared to the size of their domestic economies: Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia. Russia was in the second step at the moment, not far from the third one, and this was confirmed in a further study (Kalotay, 2004a) .
The aforementioned econometric exercise showed that OFDI from transition countries was primarily explained by two variables, their level of economic development (GDP per capita) and their industrial structure -the respective share of the primary sector, different manufacturing industries, and services). The domestic technological level, to a lesser extent, had an explanatory power. In some countries like Russia (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan) natural resource endowment was a significant variable as well.
Insert Table 1 (Andreff, 2013) . A last index leans us to assess that Russia went up to the third step of Dunning"s IDP in the 2000s -and may come closer to the fourth step in the 2010s -which is the ratio between FDI outward and inward stock, in the range of 75% to 95% from 2007 to 2011 -the fourth step is characterised by a stabilised ratio over 100% 3 .
Outward FDI from Russia: comparison with other transition economies and China
Their EU accession strongly boosted Central Eastern European countries" (CEECs) inward and outward FDI (Kalotay, 2006) . (Table 2) . Consequently, the magnitude of the OFDI stock from Russia was three times bigger than the one from the ten CEECs altogether in 2000; it went up to four times bigger in 2007. From 1999 to 2007, the growth of OFDI from Russia has also been faster than the one from the so-called BRICs (Andreff, 2013) . 
Insert Table 2 about here
In relative terms (Table 3) , Russian OFDI upgraded its structure compared with the 27 transition countries when it comes to the two following criteria: a ratio between the OFDI stock and domestic GDP on the one hand and, on the other hand, a ratio of outward to inward FDI stock. In 1999, according to the first ratio, Russia was ranked 8 th among transition countries and was already on the top regarding the second ratio. In 2007, its ranking had improved as regard the first ratio (2 nd rank behind Estonia) and still had the lead with the second ratio. In 2011, Russia was top for both ratios. If we require both a ratio of OFDI stock to GDP markedly higher than 5% and an outward/inward FDI stock higher than 25% as the (Kalotay, 2008b) . 
Insert

Russian outward FDI muddling through the crisis
What is at stake during the current global financial crisis and economic recession is to know whether Russian OFDI would be able to get closer to the fourth IDP step with an outward stock steadily bigger than its inward stock. The crisis has triggered a collapse of world FDI 
From outward FDI determinants to MNCs strategies: an analytical synthesis
The rest of this chapter refers to an analytical framework which must be briefly reminded.
Contemporaneous analyses of OFDI regarding emerging countries and their MNCs often distinguish between pull factors and push factors (Dunning, 2008; Gugler and Boie, 2008) .
Pull factors are those which attract and drive inward FDI into a given country, otherwise coined host country"s factors of attractiveness to FDI. They differentiate host countries. Some well-known and tested examples are: host investment climate and country risk, the judicial and fiscal environment provided to foreign investors and host government policies (of which liberalisation and privatisation), host country"s inflation rate, growth rate, interest rate and spread, fiscal deficit, exchange rate, unemployment rate, unit labour cost, market size, tax pressure, access to local high technology or natural resources, and the quality of local institutions such as the rule of law, the efficiency of government expenditure, political stability and control of corruption (tested in M. & W. Andreff, 1997 Andreff, & 2005 , as well as host country"s participation to regional international agreements and trade areas. Thus, when analysing OFDI, the explanatory power of pull factors is basically to point out which host countries do attract foreign investments flowing from any home country. In other words, pull factors definitely are the determinants of the geographical distribution between host countries of OFDI from (a given set of) home countries.
Push factors usually are referred to as home country-specific. They basically are drivers for a home country substituting investment abroad to domestic investment; they explain why investment is pushed outwards the domestic borders. Push factors obviously underlie the IDP model such as the domestic market size (GDP or population as a proxy) and economic development (GDP per capita), its technological level, its industrial structure (the distribution of value added across different industries) and less stable variables such as growth rate and exchange rate (Andreff, 2003c) . In addition, often listed push factors are: excess domestic production capacity, domestic market saturation, home competitive pressures, trade barriers, increasing domestic production costs, inflation hikes, using the domestic natural resource base for expanding abroad, underdeveloped domestic capital market, bad or worsening local business environment that triggers investing abroad to hedge against domestic uncertain investment climate, domestic government policies; and, in post-communist countries, escaping the troubles of an economic system in transition (Bulatov, 1998) . Now, which are the relationships between OFDI pull and push factors on the one hand and, on the other hand, the strategies of MNCs? Pull factors are the determinants of a MNC (outward investor) trade-off between host countries and between resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and asset-seeking strategies typified by Dunning, and a possible global strategy. The latter is a MNC multi-faceted strategy -not only restricted to a geographical dimension or a set of industries -and merges market, efficiency, resource and asset-seeking FDI motives. It is analysed in depth as global in scope, distributing all the MNC"s chain value all over the globe, maximising the parent company"s global (consolidated) profit typical in global oligopolies, based on a post-Fordist high tech and flexible production process that can easily be fragmented and relocated (Andreff, 2009a) , a networking organisation, strategic alliances with other MNCs, and the internationalisation of shareholding (Andreff, 1999a (Andreff, & 2003a Yip 1997) . Pull factors determine a MNC choice to invest in one host country rather than another one on the basis of their attractiveness variables (Andreff 1999b; Michalet 1997 Michalet & 1999 . Thus, they appeal MNCs in various host countries, largely shape the OFDI geographical distribution and provide the rationale for the different strategies used to invest in various host countries, including the best appropriate mode of entry to each strategy.
The relationships between OFDI push factors and MNC strategies are straightforward. Push factors are the determinants of a company"s propensity to substitute OFDI to domestic investment and they are embedded in the home country"s economy: the domestic market size, its level of economic development, its macroeconomic variables (inflation, growth, unemployment, exchange rates, etc.), the domestic costs of factors of production, home investment regulation, if any, and institutions, how the home government interacts with companies" investment decisions, all factors that may depend on domestic industries and markets a company is involved in. Therefore, push factors are determined by domestic macroeconomic dynamics and industrial structure and, thus, widely determine home country"s MNCs from one industry rather than another to invest abroad. They are drivers of the FDI outflows, foreign assets and foreign subsidiaries industrial distribution achieved by homebased MNCs, and to some extent they are linked to the IDP step a home country is evolving in. Consequently, push factors influence the FDI "mode of leaving" a home country, namely a MNC"s trade-off between greenfield investment, mergers and acquisitions (M&As), round tripping FDI and capital flight.
Thus, a MNC undertakes a FDI when pull and push factors fit together -and the mode of leaving a home country is in accordance with the mode of entry in a given host country. A MNC operating in a small or slow-growing or saturated domestic market adopts a marketseeking strategy geared towards bigger or fast-growing host markets. High or increasing domestic unit production costs determine MNCs to seek host countries with lower unit costs through an efficiency-seeking FDI. Scarce or shortening natural resources at home push MNCs to secure their input supply from well-endowed host countries with a resource-seeking strategy. These double fits between domestic push factors and host countries" pull factors crucially determine the OFDI geographical distribution and industrial structure.
Specificities and determinants of outward FDI from Russia
Although OFDI from Russia is the 15 th most important source of OFDI worldwide in 2011, just behind China and right ahead of Sweden, it is sometimes coined "non-conventional" (Kuznetsov, 2010a) . For sure, it is quite specific with regards to its geographical distribution, industrial structure, and determinants. The initial geographical orientation of Russian OFDI was geared towards the "close abroad", i.e. the CIS independent member states, as a legacy from the past. Various studies confirmed a significant involvement of Russian FDI in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (Yeremeyeva, 2009; Blyakha, 2009) America.
Geographical and industrial specificities of Russian outward FDI
Insert Table 6 about here
In the past recent years, the OFDI geographical distribution has started changing (Table 6 ).
More non European countries now appear among the major host areas for Russian MNCs settlement, namely the U.S., Canada, the United Arab Emirates, and India. Since 2005, Russian MNCs have made noticeable acquisitions in developing countries, focusing on Asia and Africa (Kalotay, 2008b) . To some extent, Russian MNCs are somewhat loosing their specificity as companies from emerging countries supposed to achieve most of their OFDI on an "intra-regional" base in countries located in the same region of the world as their home The industrial structure of Russian OFDI 11 is also specific when compared to both emerging countries" OFDI and the structure of the domestic economy in Russia. In 2008, as to Rosstat data, the Russian economy"s GDP broke down into: 21.3% for trade, 18.0% for the manufacturing industry, 15.0% for services (including finance), 9.6% for transport and communication, 9.5% for the mining industry, 6.7% for construction, 5.9% for education, health and the social sector, 5.1% for administration, defence and social insurance, 5.0% for agriculture, and 3.0% for electricity, gas and water. The industrial distribution of Russian 
The determinants of OFDI and trans-border mergers and acquisitions
A genuine theory specifically explaining the strategies of Russian MNCs and the determinants of their OFDI is not available so far. Obviously, such theory should not be far away from the analysis of OFDI determinants from the BRICs and emerging countries in the framework of the IDP model. Though successfully tested for transition countries taken together (Andreff, 2003c) , the latter does not entirely account for the whole specificity of Russian MNCs. It is even contented that Russian OFDI is not actually verifying the IDP model (Kalotay, 2008a) because it started up as a form of capital flight linked to bad domestic investment climate until 1998. Moreover, a number of companies became MNCs overnight with the break-up of the former Soviet Union whereas those assets grabbed by a handful of powerful oligarchs in the privatisation drive had rapidly evolved into MNCs. Besides, a number of Russian MNCs compare to those MNCs based in developed countries (Kuznetsov, 2010b) . Russia"s and host country"s GDP, as proxies for the respective size of their markets;
. the share NR h of natural resources and raw materials in overall Russian exports to each host country h, which is assumed to reflect its comparative endowment in natural resources;
. the share of services in the host country"s GDP SER h ;
. the geographical distance between Russia and each host country DIST rh , a classical gravity variable;
. the rouble exchange rate against a host country"s currency  rh ;
. a dummy variable standing for CIS membership which is assumed to represent a cultural proximity between Russia and a host country;
. the number of patents registered in a host country PAT h showing whether a country h is a favourable location for Russian MNCs where to acquire technological assets.
It results from econometric testing that market size is the most significant explanatory variable: Russian MNCs first invest abroad to capture foreign markets. The NR h variable is also significant: Russian MNCs invest abroad to secure their supply of natural resources. The share of the tertiary sector (services) in the host economy, the distance from Russia, exchange rate, and the cultural proximity are not significant determinants of Russian OFDI. Despite its obvious interest, this modelling is submitted to two limitations: it does not explain at all the determinants of Russian greenfield investment abroad -if by chance they were different from those of M&As -and, more basically, it does not introduce either a dummy variable for the influence of Russian government 13 on the strategies conducted by Russian MNCs, whatever state-owned or privately-owned, or any other push factor.
12 Technically speaking, it is a log-linear model which all variables are in log except the geographical distance and a dummy for CIS membership. 13 Kalotay and Sulstarova (2010) take into account a change in the government policy with simply distinguishing the period when B. Yeltsin was the President of the Russian Federation from the one when V. Putin stepped in. Kalotay (2008a) stressed an increasing role of the government in controlling those companies exploiting natural
Similarities and differences between Russian and Chinese multinational companies
Russian MNCs nearly caught up Chinese MNCs during the past decade while the latter still benefited from the first mover advantage of their front running OFDI which commenced more than thirty years ago. Nevertheless the result is a more similar than different OFDI regime.
Russian multinationals: from opacity to globalisation …or copying China?
Russian MNCs are used to disclose a very little information with regards to their economic activity abroad 14 . This strategy of opacity, non transparency and information concealment is a typical feature of Russian MNCs, even though it is slightly stepping back now. The expansion of Russian MNCs abroad has often been interpreted in a first phase as capital runaway, if not an exodus, toward friendly, more stable, and less risky foreign investment climates than in the Russian domestic market (Bulatov, 1998; Kalotay, 2004b; Vahtra & Liuhto, 2004) . Round tripping FDI is exemplary of such strategy which has been more widespread in the 1990s than in the 2000s before the crisis.
Another strategy in a sense follows up the one of former red multinationals developed to serve former Soviet foreign trade purposes. Rather frequent in Russian manufacturing industry, it is a market-seeking OFDI relaying previous export. Market-seeking FDI strategy pertains to traditional markets such as the CIS; it is also the rationale for Russian OFDI in Western markets where Russian firms face tough competition and are strongly challenged when entering in. Those Russian MNCs which invest abroad in mining, oil and gas industries have adopted a resource-seeking approach and attempted to take over their most needed suppliers abroad by means of M&As. Russian OFDI in the CIS is basically resource-seeking geared towards oil, gas and mining. The same strategy applies to the fairly recent Russian OFDI in Africa though it is mitigated here with a motive of accessing to new consumer markets.
Russian MNCs have not yet adopted an efficiency-seeking strategy although they could have envisaged it in lower production cost CIS and developing countries. However a sort of efficiency-seeking OFDI emerged with the purpose of consolidating or re-integrating assets located in CIS countries and the CEECs (Filipov, 2010) . Finally, Russian companies have resources as the most specific factor that impeded applying all the FDI explanatory theories to the analysis of Russian MNCs. 14 For example, Gazprom for years did not provide those data requested by UNCTAD for its world investment report.
conducted an asset-seeking strategy based on M&As in view of acquiring Western technology and R&D intensive units.
Insert Table 7 (Table 7) . Big trans-border M&As are less frequent in the "close abroad" whose firms are of smaller size and less attractive in terms of high tech assets. A few exceptions are the Vimpelcom-Kyivstar, Gazprom-Beltransgaz, and Evraz-Sukhaya Balka deals. The share of the primary sector is steadily around 60% of all M&A deals while the share of the manufacturing industry is below 25% since 1997 (Table 8) in 2010 (Filipov, 2011) .
Insert Table 8 A few Russian MNCs seem to have turned to a global strategy in the past recent years, not only as far as their geographical orientation is concerned, but also in playing on all the cords of such a strategy (Andreff, 2003b) . One of them consists in integrating all their value chain on a world scale; the different sequences of the production and trade process (input purchase, supply, production, products delivery, sales, and after-sale services) are allocated in various countries depending on profitability criteria. In recent years, this tendency was observed with
Russian MNCs (Vahtra, 2010) . In view of international chain value integration, the latter have often bought or merged assets located abroad, which is a second dimension of a global 
Insert Table 11 about here
The most striking feature in the industrial structure of Chinese OFDI is the high share of services, between one-third and two-fifths in the total. If one adds banking and trade to other services, the share of the tertiary sector is up to about 60% of overall OFDI (Table 12) , which resembles the industrial structure of OFDI from developed countries. Investing abroad in the tertiary sector is typical of the global strategy conducted by major Western MNCs (Andreff, 2003a In an explanatory model rather similar to the previous one, Rodriguez and Bustillo (2011) introduce a host country"s governance variable taken as usual as the average of the six World
Bank"s indicators of control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulation quality, rule of law, voice and accountability (Kaufmann et al., 2008 there into larger and poorer countries well endowed with fuels.
Insert Table 13 MNCs merged or acquired 83 companies located in the EU countries (Clegg and Voss, 2012) .
In transition economies, CNPC bought a $500 million stake during Rosneft"s initial public offering and Sinopec acquired a 96.9% share in Udmurneft in Russia. CNPC acquired the North Buzachi oilfield in Kazakhstan through the purchase of Canada-based PetroKazakhstan and took a 25% stake in the Saylan oilfield in Azerbaijan, and son on (Table 13) .
However, some Chinese MNCs have failed in their M&A strategy, for instance TLC and SAIC in South Korea. It is reported that 90% of the 300 trans-border M&As achieved between 2008 and 2010 failed and translated into a 40% fall in the stock value of those companies involved (Richet, 2013) . Thus, in presence of very high country risk, Chinese
MNCs prefer greenfield investment. When a host country has stronger national innovation ability or higher level of human capital, Chinese firms tend to choose M&As. An increase in the cultural distance appears to induce Chinese MNCs to select M&As as well (Hu et al., 2012) . The number and magnitude of trans-border M&A deals by Chinese MNCs on average are much bigger than those observed for Russian MNCs.
Which standing for multinationals in Russian and Chinese state capitalisms?
A study on MNCs based in the BRICs (Holtbrügge and Kreppel, 2012) concludes that while the internationalisation of Brazilian and Indian companies is primarily driven by economic motives, many Chinese and Russian firms also receive substantial political support from their governments to invest abroad, especially in strategically important industries. The Chinese government explicitly launched and then institutionalised a "go global" OFDI strategy while
Russia proceeded with a less formal support policy to Russia-based MNCs relying on oral incentives, economic influence and some watchwords like "copy China".
Russian multinationals: instrumental to Russia's foreign policy
A nice typology of Russian MNCs has been put forward (Liuhto and Vahtra, 2007) . Transparent Patriots: refer to companies which somewhat disclose their financial accounts though they are in partial or overall state ownership; but they have already reached a strong position in international markets (ex: Gazprom 18 , Alrosa, Inter RAO UES);
. Non Transparent Independents: are those companies that are not (or only slightly) controlled by the state but whose corporate governance misses transparency; they often invest abroad through offshore subsidiaries located in tax havens (ex: Evraz, Severstal, Rusal);
. (Andreff, 2007a (Andreff, & 2009 . Before the crisis, Russian MNCs were described as a form of soft power which had replaced the military power of the Russian regime, in particular throughout the "close abroad" (Vahtra, 2005) . During the Yeltsin era, the government was proactive through its privatisation 20 programme in creating big privatelyowned companies in monopoly or oligopoly situation which swiftly transformed into MNCs.
However Russia did not promote OFDI under the Yeltsin presidency. Under the Putin presidency, the Russian state has clearly shifted its objectives toward promoting OFDI, mostly in the service of national strategic goals. Since then Russia conducts a "national champions" policy providing support to companies investing abroad in key industries.
In the 2000s, the government has reinforced its role in the economy through a swifter SOEs" expansion and partial re-nationalisation in some industries. Including as a result of the infamous and controversial scheme -even criticised by the World Bank -of loans for shares privatisation in 1996 which immediately came out with a phase of oligarchic capitalism in Russia (Andreff, 2005; Hedlund, 2001) . These oligarchs are still today at the head of several significant Russian MNCs: Basic Element (Oleg Deripaska), Renova (Viktor Vekselberg), Alfa Group (Mikhaïl Friedman), Interros (Vladimir Potanin), Sistema (Vladimir Evtuchenkov) and so on (Kuznetsov, 2007) .
financial groups owned by oligarchs in a firm hand strengthened the dimension of a state capitalism in Russia.
In a meeting with Russian CEOs from the manufacturing industry in 2007, V. Putin enjoined them to proceed more and more with a production diversification, export of high tech products and investment abroad. Thus Russian MNCs, whatever privately or state-owned, are incited by the state to go on internationalising. In industries linked to raw materials and natural resources, the government intends to keep an overall direct and indirect control over especially turned into a tool to serve Russia"s international relationships, including through controlling the network of oil pipelines and gas pipes, which is also a means for a state control over exports (Locatelli, 2007) . Indeed, many Russian MNCs achieve their OFDI for the sake of the national economic interest as it is meant by highest governmental authorities. Russian state-owned MNCs are often heavily influenced by or incited to stick to major objectives of Russia"s foreign policy.
However, the relationships between the state and big Russian companies/MNCs are no more rooted, as during the 1990s, in a context of state capture by private concerns (Andreff, 2007b) , and no longer based on naked asset grabbing (Frye and Shleifer, 1997) . Yakovlev (2010) showed that a sort of "model of exchange" has been reached in the relationships between the state and big companies. In this model, the latter benefit from subsidies, tax exemptions and various aids from the government but "in exchange" they have to bear without complaining some duties and additional costs such as a regulation of their product prices, frequent administrative supervision and a waste of time in their communication with the bureaucrats.
Russian state capitalism has reached a kind of maturity in its evolution and adaptation to a globalisation context in crisis. Expansionist objectives of state-owned and privately-owned Russian MNCs are not autonomous vis-à-vis the government willingness to be a global player in the world economy. The Russian government trusts and supports them to become powerful actors in the world markets, in particular in the markets for energy. Russian political influence is a push factor of Russian investment expansion for instance in Central Asia; the Russian government tries to help Russian MNCs in Asia and Africa as well.
In the wake of the subprime crisis, the financial situation deteriorated in Russia and the economy collapsed into a recession in 2009. Even the big fortunes were affected by the crisis, namely those Russian oligarchs indebted to Western banks 21 . The government took advantage of the crisis to spread its grips over the whole Russian economy. Government assistance to indebted Russian MNCs came from the state-owned VEB which bailed them out and placed a representative in the companies boards who has the right to veto any debt or major asset sale.
It took over Norilsk Nickel and should definitively own 25% of its stockholding equity belonging to O. Deripaska if he would not be able to reimburse a safety loan that he got from the government. M. Friedman, the CEO of Alfa Group, obtained $2 billion from VEB in order to rescue Vimpelcom, the biggest Russian mobile phone operator. NPOSaturn, a missile and aircraft engine builder received a financial aid from the government in exchange for 48.8% of its stockholding equity. Taking excuse of the crisis to help Russian MNCs the government sealed a deeper alliance with them typical of Russia"s state capitalism evolving in the framework of a globalised economy.
Finally the current specificity of Russian MNCs is due to how they are inserted into domestic state capitalism with: 1/ they benefited from the fastest international growth in the world, in Western Europe and North America, the more they will be requested to reveal their shareholders" structure and introduce more transparency in their transactions and finance.
Overall, the WTO accession of the Russian Federation in December 2011 may trigger a new impetus for both OFDI from Russia and more transparent strategies.
"China Incorporated": state promotion of Chinese multinationals
State intervention in Chinese OFDI relies on the government quest for natural resources in short supply at home, a high degree of regulation and control over Chinese OFDI, and a high number of state-owned MNCs. The role of the state in Chinese firms" OFDI is to formally push these emerging MNCs to go overseas by releasing various motivating policies and providing a support from the bureaucratic administration, formally use a state-oriented OFDI strategy to be enforced in Chinese MNCs" behaviours, and informally shape their choices through propagating a firm state ideology and national pride. In this perspective, the Chinese government had adopted a "go global" (zou chu qu) policy in 1999, officially expressed by President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji, which explicitly supported OFDI by Chinese companies; not only explicit, and contrary to Russia, this support was eventually materialised in three fiats passed in 2004-05 22 which both promoted and regulated OFDI.
Chinese OFDI is thus subject to multiple layers of hierarchical bureaucratic supervision and The efforts of China"s big businesses to "go global" can be thought of as being part of a national power-building of China state capitalism"s globalisation strategy. Facilitated by extended protection from the state, reaching beyond China"s national boundaries, Chinese large SOEs raise investment capital and take risks that their foreign competitors, submitted to a hard budget constraint, do not (Yao et al., 2010 appointed by the SASAC which is a concern both in terms of weak corporate governance structure and state influencing the whole companies" management.
Even partly privately-owned MNCs such as Haier, Lenovo, Huawei, which promote themselves as private companies, though benefiting from some flexibility, keep strong ties with the government. Chinese SOEs not only possess more firm-specific advantages than private companies (Liu and Scott-Kennel, 2011 ) but benefit from competitive advantages built up by state OFDI regulation and promotion. However, the OFDI determinants are different for Chinese state-owned MNCs and privately-owned MNCs as tested by Amighini et al. (2012) . Private MNCs are attracted in large markets and by host country strategic assets; they are averse to economic and political risks when choosing their location abroad on the one hand; on the other hand, state-owned MNCs follow China"s strategic needs and thus invest more in natural resources abroad, and are widely indifferent to political and economic conditions in host countries -a result which is tune with the one found for all Chinese MNCs by Rodriguez and Bustillo (2011) . This means that state-owned MNCs have definitely a dominant strategic role in Chinese OFDI and are very sensitive to push factors while privately-owned MNCs react more intensively to pull factors.
A significant difference between Chinese state-owned and Russian MNCs is that enterprise capabilities of the former have not been upgraded through privatisation; "corporatisation" was basically considered as enough to improve corporate governance in China. Listing their stocks in financial markets, at home and abroad, corporatised SOEs were transformed into joint stock companies benefiting from larger access to finance. However their highly concentrated ownership in state hands gives their largest or unique shareholder a substantial discretionary power to use the firm resources; there from result even more serious issues of insider control and possible minority shareholder despoilment than after Russian privatisations (Andreff, 2005) . A dominant control by the government also plants the worst seeds for flourishing corruption (Luo & Tung, 2007) . Therefore, when transforming into MNCs, Chinese SOEs met deep criticisms, at least from Western competitors and host countries, about the accountability, transparency, and trustworthiness of their corporate governance, a criticism sometimes heard about state-owned Russian MNCs too.
In such context, it may be contended (Ren et al., 2010) Filipov (2010) and Vahtra (2010) . (2) Failed due to political objections and national security reasons. Source: adapted from H. Rui, G.S. Yip, S. Prashantham (2010) and Salidjanova (2011) . 
